GalleryPOLAND DRIFTS INTO HITLER'S ORBIT
Very soon it became evident that Poland's non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany was very aggressive, not only against the Soviet Union but against its former allies including those to whom it owed its very existence. Raymond Leslie Buell commented: "Poland proceeded to go beyond the published version of the Non-Aggression Pact. It showed its hostility to the whole thesis of 'Collective Security' as compared to the German thesis of 'Bilateral Pacts.' This attitude may have been due to a secret agreement. A more plausible explanation for Poland's policy was its belief that the League had become an ideological alliance inspired by Russia and directed against the Fascist states, a belief reinforced by the withdrawal of Germany, Italy and Japan. In the autumn of 1938 Poland declined to stand for re-election to the League Council."1
In the winter of 1938 when Hitler seized Austria, Poland followed suit by forcing Lithuania to make "peace" with her as a preliminary to its future annexation. In the final Munich crisis of September, 1938, while the crucified Czechoslovak people were debating resistance to the Nazi ultimatum, the Polish army mobilized and placed itself squarely between Czechoslovakia and its hopes of assistance from the Red Army. Simultaneously Poland served an ultimatum on Czechoslovakia demanding the immediate cession of the Teschen district. This Polish stab in the back played no small part in forcing the Czechoslovak Government to yield at Munich.2
After helping the Nazi lion gobble up Czechoslovakia the Polish jackal suddenly realized that it was next on the Nazi menu. In the spring of 1939 Poland began shamefaced efforts to renew the ties it had dropped in the democratic camp and reminded itself that it was still a member of the League of Nations. It even began to consider the question of coming to terms with the Soviet Union. But there was a cleavage in the Polish ruling class which stultified any decisive step in that direction. The Polish bourgeoisie, with industrial interests mainly in Western Poland, i.e., in Poland proper, had most to fear from Germany and therefore pressed for a Soviet alliance. But the military clique of Marshal Smigly-Rydz and Colonel Beck, which was in the saddle, mostly East Polish landowners with vast estates in western White Russia and the Ukraine, had no stomach for a Soviet alliance. The dominant wing of the Polish ruling class preferred risking the independence of Poland rather than their private estates.3
There is no doubt that the outbreak of this war was hastened by the disinclination of the Allies to accept the Soviet conditions for effective Allied-Soviet military cooperation, and that, in turn, was primarily due to the suicidal obstinacy of the Polish Government in refusing to permit the Red Army to occupy battle stations in "Eastern Poland." Nevertheless, when war broke out, the Soviet Union, if for no other than selfish reasons, was only too anxious for Poland's resistance to the Nazis to be as prolonged as possible.4
| 1 | While Brody's citations of Buell appear to paint a poor picture of Poland, we expect, not currently having the source ourselves, that Buell's overall assessment is far more positive, per his comments after his visit to Poland in 1938: "Even admitting the defects in Poland's social structure and the unrepresentative nature of its government, spiritually it formed part of the West. Its difficulties after [World War I] in bringing about unity and reconstruction were greater than those of any other state; and its achievements during the past twenty-five years have been little less than remarkable..." Hoover, who also revisited Poland in 1938 after administering post-WWI relief there, found: "Here... was a nation transformed, regenerated. The standards of living were improving. New homes and factories had risen in every city. Transportation and communication were advancing. Education had become universal." On the other hand, the historical DNA of both Germany and Russia was that Poland was a backward land of peasants which did not deserve to exist. While the British and French were shocked by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as Stalin's rebuff of their efforts to mount an alliance with the Soviets including the defense of Poland, it was no surprise to the Poles themselves. |
| 2 | Poland's demand to Lithuania was to establish diplomatic relations in light of developments in Europe. While this technically implied legalization of Poland's annexation of Vilnius, Lithuania denied de facto recognition. The Czechoslovak territory in question was part of a region occupied by Czechoslovakia after WWI and contained a substantial number of Poles. |
| 3 | It bears repeating that the USSR had no interest in the independence of any of its western neighbors. |
| 4 | Of course Poland would refuse Soviet passage as part of any collective agreement to defend Czechoslovakia, anticipating this would lead to re-occupation. We still find this propagandistic contention, blaming Poland for starting WWII, in contemporary Russian "scholarship" (Dyukov et al.). Russian propaganda also blames Poland for starting WWI by not granting Hitler rights to the Polish Corridor. (In reality, the Polish representative present did not have the authority to agree to yet another German territorial demand the British deemed "reasonable." Ribbentrop left, and the Polish response was characterized as a refusal.) The Baltic States, similarly, refused British and French attempts to bargain away their freedom in return for assistance against Hitler. Nevertheless, Britain and France had already given up the Baltic States to Stalin, having, in fact, met all Stalin's conditions for a collective security agreement prior to Stalin concluding his deal with Hitler. |
