How Stalin Got the Baltic StatesDr. Vilnis V. Šveics, 1989

1. Spheres of Influence in 1939.

International negotiations and accords divided spheres of influence in the Baltic region in the summer of 1939. The last summer of Baltic independence was a time of momentous negotiations of Britain, France and Germany with the Soviet Union. How did their respective arrangements affect the fate of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania?

a. Quest for a Triple Entente of Britain, France and the USSR.

London and Paris began direct, serious negotiations with Moscow in April. The aim of the intense diplomatic activity was to conclude not only a political alliance to be called Triple Entente, but also a pact providing for a close military cooperation of the three Powers against Germany. The talks were making considerable progress and led to many agreements. They stalled only hours before the surprising conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Berlin and Moscow.

In the meantime Moscow had obtained many concessions from its British and French partners. London and Paris had recognized, that the Baltic States were in the Russian sphere of influence. From the very beginning of the talks the Western Powers had also granted Moscow the right to occupy the three countries militarily, in case of an attack on the USSR in the Baltic area. By the end of July it was agreed, that the Soviets could move in, even in case of an "indirect aggression". One Latvian investigator writes, that "the English yielded on the question of indirect 7 aggression to avoid a breakdown of the Moscow talks".1 Another historian states without qualification:

The view still held among Baltic exiles, that the negotiations of the Western Powers in Moscow failed, because of the attitude of Baltic States toward 'guarantees' and 'help', is mistaken. Already in the political part of the negotiations (April to June) a formula had been agreed upon, 'which satisfied the Soviet Union as far as Estonia, Latvia and Finland were concerned'.

He documents, that British Government instructions to the members of their Military Commission did not even mention Finland, Estonia or Latvia among countries to be discussed and declared, that "in the course of the political negotiations HM's Government have given way to (Russia) as regards — 1. covering the case of the Baltic States..."2 

The signing of a formal treaty, including these concessions, was prevented by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

b. The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

The imminent conclusion of a English-French-Russian alliance would mean a political and military encirclement of Germany. It would limit Berlin's freedom of action and prevent it from pressing her demands on Poland by peaceful or by military means. To avoid that, Berlin finally decided to reach an agreement with Moscow as late as August 14. The turning point was Foreign Minister Ribbentrop's telegram to the Soviet capital. A leading British historian notes:

This message was the first real move in German-Soviet relations. Until then they had been stagnant....

Germany offered not only a non-aggression pact, but a joint guaranty of the Baltic States and mediation between Soviet Russia and Japan.3 8 

Moscow accepted the offer. Stalin used it to stay out of an expected conflict in Europe; he hoped that Germany and the Anglo-French Entente would exhaust each other, and that the USSR would then emerge as the strongest power on the Continent.

The accord between Berlin and Moscow, known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, was concluded in the Soviet capital on August 23, 1939. It consisted of a Nonaggression Treaty and a Secret Protocol. The latter drew a line between German and Russian "spheres of influence" in Europe and left (after a modification a month later) Finland and the three Baltic countries in the Russian sphere.

The four countries were not specifically discussed in the short negotiations, nor was the term "spheres of influence" defined.4

c. What are "Spheres of Influence'?

Since the Anglo-French as well as the German negotiators assigned the Baltic countries to the Soviet sphere of influence, it is fitting to ascertain the meaning of the term in international relations.

A leading international law manual of the 20th century declares:

Spheres of influence play a special role in the world politics of the Great Powers today. They arise when one state secures for itself the exclusive (ausschliessliche) exercise of political or economic influence in the territory of another state.5

The definition names three elements: (1) influence of a political or economic character; (2) its exercise in another state, meaning a sovereign international entity; and (3) its exclusive nature against another power.

In addition to spheres of influence properly so called, states often use the same term to describe entirely different kinds of arrangements among them — namely the de facto or de iure annexations of all or part of other countries by one 9 of the parties. We shall examine instances of such agreements shortly.

Two kinds of accords are, thus, given the name "sphere of influence": First, true spheres of influence: the predominant or exclusive political or economic influence of one state on another. An agreement or treaty concerning such sphere among the contracting parties is no more than the exclusion of one party from exercising influence in a specified territory. It states solely: "We have no special interests in the named area. "Second, the recognition of one party to the treaty or agreement of the (formal or informal, de facto or de iure) occupation, subjugation or annexation of specified territories by the other contracting party. An agreement or treaty of this, second, kind states, in effect;" We recognize that the named area belongs to you."

Is a particular agreement a true division of spheres of influence or is it a euphemistic approval of annexation and incorporation? That can be determined either from the terms of the international accord itself or from the political situation at the time and the actual or anticipated future developments in the territories in question, or both.

What was the nature of the Anglo-French agreements and of the German pact with Moscow in 1939? Both are essentially a true division of spheres of interest in the Baltic region. Both refer to the Baltic States as sovereign, separate entities. None envisaged the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania into the Soviet Union, although both of them assigned the three countries to the Russian sphere of influence. (The Entente did recognize the right of the USSR to temporarily occupy — but not to annex — them, but only in the case of a direct or indirect aggression against the Soviet Union in that part of Europe.)

d. Demise of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

Official Soviet declarations, comments of informed observers and German reaction to Russian aggression in the Baltic area provide an insight into the character of the treaty about the spheres of influence and about its extinction.

(i) Soviet declarations and statements were explicit and consistent. The Kremlin and its envoys abroad repeated 10 again and again and again, that the sovereignty, the political, economic and social system of the Baltic States would be respected and the principle of noninterference in their internal affairs observed. We find assurances to that effect in the official Communiqué and Soviet government newspaper Izvestia's commentary on the conclusion of the Mutual Assistance Pacts with the three countries in October 1939. The Pact with Latvia expressly stipulated that their mutual peace treaty (of 11. Aug., 1920) and nonaggression pact (of 6. Feb., 1932) remained in force unchanged and assured (in paragraph 5) strict respect for the parties' "sovereign rights, especially their government, economic and political system..." etc. The commentary stressed that such declarations had "a vast significance as an expression of basic principles".6 

The statement of Soviet military attaché in Riga to an American diplomat, in September 1939, that "Molotov had notified the Baltic States that, if they observed favorable neutrality, their independence would be respected," was typical of Russian diplomatic statements in many countries.7 

Molotov himself made repeated statements that Moscow did not claim more than a true sphere of influence in the area. In a major policy speech as Government chief and Commissar for foreign affairs he declared on October 31, 1939:

These pacts are based on mutual respect for the political, social and economic structure of the contracting parties, and are designed to strengthen the basis for peaceful, neighborly cooperation. We stand for scrupulous and punctilious observance of pacts on a basis of complete reciprocity, and we declare that all nonsense about sovietizing the Baltic countries is only in the interest of our common enemies and all anti-Soviet provocateurs.

On March 29, 1940, the Soviet Foreign Minister promised "further amelioration of relations between the 11 USSR and the Baltic States" and made the following declaration:

In the light of a half-year's experience we can draw quite definite and favorable conclusions concerning the treaties with the Baltic States, namely, that contrary to the fears voiced by anti-Soviet imperialist circles, the political independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and their independent political courses have not been affected.8

For almost 50 years some Baltic commentators have interpreted these Soviet statements as attempts "to dispel the suspicions of the Latvians"9 Estonians and Lithuanians; to reassure the government and press in Kaunas, Riga or Tallinn. With all due respect for the importance of our three nations, I submit that Stalin did not care at all about the feelings or intentions of the people, media and officials in the three republics.

'The Great Father, Friend and Teacher' of the Soviet people was, as a matter of fact, trying to reassure Hitler that, despite the installation of military garrisons in the Baltic countries, he was not violating the Pact of August 23, 1939. Molotov's repeated protests, that the USSR "stands for an honest and scrupulous fulfillment of the agreements signed" and assurances that Baltic "sovereignty, political, economic and social system," would be respected etc., were intended to persuade the Germans that the Russians had not gone beyond a permissible exercise of influence.

When Stalin finally decided to violate the agreement, he chose the very moment when retaliation was impossible — the Soviets "sneaked into" the Baltic States while the German, as well as the British and French, armed forces were fully committed in the West, unable to counter Russian advances in the East. The occupation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia began one day after German forces entered Paris.

(ii) Well informed Western diplomats and scholars treat the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact as a true division of spheres of influence. The Latvian envoy to Germany writes that he 12 received the news of the Pact provisions from a highly placed Wilhelmstrasse official. Both the envoy and the official had been unable to guess what the term "spheres of influence" would mean in practice; neither of the two diplomats had thought of a military occupation.10 An outstanding British historian writes that the "secret protocol to the mutual non-aggression pact excluded Germany from the Baltic States.... (It was a) limitation of German gains in... the Baltic..."11 The leading American Sovietologist describes how the defeat of France, in June 1940, affected Stalin:

Alarmed at the prospect (of a powerful Germany turning to the east), Stalin saw nothing better to do, than to tighten the hold on the sphere of influence he gained in 1939. In the preceding autumn he had. ... put military bases in the Baltic States. In June 1940, he proceeded with a brusqueness and brutality, that took even the Germans aback to extinguish the independence of these countries and to incorporate them into the Soviet Union. The Germans, again (my emphasis — V. V. Š.) were not asked for their views and were given scant notice.12

A French observer states the obvious - that "Russia's move into the Baltic States ...gravely irritated the Reich".13 

It is obvious that another consultation of the Germans and their irritation would have been irrelevant, if they had intended to approve Russian military bases in, and their occupation of, the three states....

(iii) German reaction to Russian attitude toward the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact lets us draw significant conclusions about its intended nature. The pact was useful to Germany only as long as it was a true restriction of influence spheres and held Soviet forces away from the borders of the Reich, avoiding the fatal threat of a struggle on two fronts. The advance of the Russians to the German frontier would immediately give rise to a crisis situation. 13 

Only 8 days after signing the arrangement, an astute diplomatic move of Wilhelmstrasse induced the Kremlin to indirectly confirm that Russia claimed no more than the customary influence in its Baltic sphere. It instructed its Moscow embassy:

We want to authorize our ambassador in Riga to answer the Latvian Foreign Minister's question, whether the Moscow talks had affected the interests of Latvia, that we know of nothing that would contradict the Nonaggression treaty between Latvia and Germany. Before we authorize our ambassador to make such a statement, we want to be sure — discuss it with Molotov! — that the Government of the Soviet Union would give a similar reply, if Latvia were to ask.

On September 3, 1939, ambassador Schulenburg answered:

After a conversation with Stalin, Molotov agreed with the answer we intend to give to Latvia. Instructions of a similar type would be given to Soviet representatives abroad.14

The Soviets did, as mentioned earlier, issue consistent pronouncements of the sort desired by Berlin.

After Russian forces moved into their Baltic bases, closer to Germany, both Molotov's assurances and Berlin's suspicions became more intense. After the Soviet Union occupied, and a few weeks later annexed, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Germany reacted with increasing resolution:

• On June 16, 1940 — as Soviet forces moved into Lithuania, but before they entered Latvia and Estonia — Ribbentrop instructed his staff "to submit a report as soon as possible as to whether in the Baltic States a tendency to seek support from the Reich can be observed or whether an attempt was made to form a bloc".15
• In accordance with a Führerbefehl of the same date, Lithuanian military units and President Smetona were granted asylum on German territory.16 14 
• In July Moscow issued one of its well known "reverse statements" — a TASS denial that German-Soviet relations had deteriorated.
• On July 22, 1940 — a mere 5 weeks after the occupation of the three Baltic countries — Hitler issued a secret directive to the army command "to take up the Russian problem, to think about preparations". This was the first order to prepare for a war with the USSR.

  The directive emphasized as a "political objective" of such a war, among others, "a Baltic confederation".17

• Two weeks after the Baltic States had been incorporated into the USSR, on August 18, Berlin inquired if Finland would permit the transit of German troops. The traffic agreement went into effect a month later. Marshal Mannerheim, one of the statesmen best qualified to evaluate the political and military situation in Northern Europe at that time, remarked:

"The Transit Agreement caused a sigh of relief in (Finland). Everyone understood that the German interest in Finland was in the existing situation our only straw, even if no one knew anything about its durability."

• On August 31, Germany guaranteed the integrity of Romania.
• On one of the first days of September Hitler called three of his military chiefs and wanted to know if it was possible to undertake something against Russia immediately. Told that that was not possible at that time, he instructed them to envisage a war in the future. The positioning of the German army was to begin immediately.19
• On October 11, German advance units entered Romania; on March 2, 1940, they entered Bulgaria. 15 
• Molotov demanded exclusive Soviet domination over Finland, Romania and Bulgaria in his talks with Hitler on November 13, 1940. The German rejected all these demands. Denying Moscow's right "to deal with Finland", "the Fiihrer replied that ...the exact meaning of the expression 'sphere of influence' was not further defined (in the Secret Protocol of August 23, 1939)".20
• Five weeks later, on December 18, 1940, Hitler issued Directive Nr. 21 — the Plan Barbarossa for a war against the USSR in 1941. The Eastern Campaign began on June 22, 1941 at 3:15 A.M.

In his Proclamation issued on the morning of June 22 at 5:30 A.M., the German named the fact that "Russia prepared to militarily subjugate not only Finland, but also the Baltic States" as proof that "Moscow has not only broken the agreement of friendship, but betrayed it in a "wretched manner" and as a reason why he had decided on war. The War Note presented to the Kremlin at the same time, included among the listed Soviet violations of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact "the conclusion of the so-called Assistance Pacts with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the establishing of military bases in these countries".21 

The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and its Secret Protocol with it, was effectively terminated. That is a fact, whether one judges from the point of view of political reality, of the relations of the contracting parties or of the established principles of international law:

(i) An informed observer only restates the obvious, when he says that treaties of friendship and nonaggression are finished, when a war breaks out among the states involved: "On.... the day when the Germans entered Russia, ...their alliance was terminated by a struggle to the death.',22 Elementary logic confirms that deadly enemies are no longer "friends"...

(ii) Sovereign states have the capacity to conclude treaties or agreements and to violate, break or cancel them. Exercising this capacity on behalf of Germany, Hitler cancelled the above named Pact by giving notice to that 16 effect in his public Proclamation at 5:30 A.M. on June 22, 1941 and the Foreign Ministry did it by delivering its War Note to Molotov at about the same time. Since that moment the Pact no longer exists.

(iii) The established rules of international law put the moment of termination even earlier in the day — at 3:15 in the morning, when the hostilities of the war first started. The cited manual stipulates the international legal effect of a state of war:

The state of war ...begins either with a formal declaration of war or with an actual outbreak of hostilities on both sides.

The treaties concluded with the enemy are thereby annulled....

The end of the state of war.... The treaties annulled by the war do not ... regain their validity.

The effect of the rule of international law is automatic.

The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact has been dead for almost fifty years, like it or not. But one could disagree about whether it died at 3:15 or at 5:30 on the morning of June 22, 1941....