A blog on the Baltics and the post-Soviet geopolitical space

Historic Rīga skyline

Tag: Post-Soviet

protest against instruction in Latvian, exhortation to not cross the "red line"

Russification under the covers

(“Nationalist”) Latvians were heartened when Latvian authorities announced plans to potentially deport some 10,000 Russian-speakers who chose Russian citizenship/passports following the restoration of independence but have failed to meet residency language requirements since. With a September 1st deadline for compliance looming, they were equally disheartened when the government backed down in late August over denunciations of “hard-line” measures. Affected individuals now have another two years’ grace period to complete their studies and pass their exam.

video snapshot of lsm.lv Latvian state broadcasting,
Latvians protesting extension of the deadline for Russian citizens to pass their residency language requirements examination. Sign means “Learn or gather your things and leave!” (via news report on lsm.lv Latvian state broadcasting)

At the moment, four accountants of the Daugavpils Education Board have been fined for not knowing Latvian sufficiently well. For now, they still have their jobs, but have to demonstrate language competency by November. From a societal perspective, as of September 1st, 129 schools and 136 kindergartens teaching in Russian have been mandated to convey education only in the state language, Latvian. Such actions have fomented denunciations by well-meaning rights activists, Kremlin trolls, and the Russian-speakers affected who, from my perspective, have enjoyed the fruits of their consequences-free self-imposed apartheid Russian privilege bubble for longer than Latvia’s first years of freedom between WWI and WWII.

It is not some innocuous bubble that is being pierced, however. Nor is this the first time Latvian language policy has been denounced. Under the pre-WWII Ulmanis regime, instruction was also standardized to be conducted in Latvian. Prior to that, national/ethnic minorities had the right to run their own schools in their own languages as long as state-mandated curriculum requirements were met. In the era of “Latvia for the Latvians,” standardization was decried as ethno-nationalist oppression; regarding prior instruction in Hebrew by its Jewish minority, the policy is portrayed today as a touchstone of pre-WWII Latvian anti-Semitism.

False. Anti-Semites denounced Latvia as a “Jewish country” for the positive view and role of Jews in society. Latvia was the only European country to ban anti-Semitic literature. Latvia served as a transit country for Jews fleeing Nazi Germany after other countries had closed their borders.

Ulmanis understood that the future economic prospects of a country the small size and population of Latvia in which not even Latvians learned in and spoke the same version of Latvian were severely constrained unless and until the Latvian language and school instruction were standardized. The impetus had nothing to do with so-called ethno-nationalism. It was a simple matter of economic survival and growth.

Once again, over eight decades—a lifetime—later, Latvian language “policy” is not about oppression of a minority but about progress of society as a whole, including, ironically, improving the circumstances of those impacted by and most vehemently opposed to the policy.

Mainstream media have trodden out accounts of elderly women lining up to take their language proficiency tests when their potential deportation was first announced, distraught that they “have no other place to go” if they fail and are expelled to their chosen country of citizenship. But the imagery of heartless Latvian nationalism run amok dissipates when you do the math. Someone 80 years old today was 48 years old when the USSR recognized Latvian independence on September 6th, 1991. Spending more than three decades not learning enough of the local language to get by is a choice. Choices eventually have consequences.

The societal choice to indulge Russian apartheidism also has consequences. Some months ago, I learned that employees at LIDO, a wildly popular buffet-style restaurant that I myself have frequented over the years on visits to Latvia—and with unbecoming salivating anticipation, conducts its employee meetings in Russian because their Russian employees don’t know Latvian. As a result, someone who does not know Russian has no career path at LIDO: lacking Russian fluency, you can’t even become a food station supervisor. Thus, there is now an entire generation of Latvian 20-30 year olds who don’t speak Russian (the language of the last occupier and centuries-old existential threat) who have no career prospects across a wide range of establishments and businesses which are “Latvian” in name and image, but are Russified under the covers.

Latvia of the first independence was cosmopolitan. Most Latvians were multi-lingual: my mother was fluent in Latvian and German (and still remembered smatterings of grade school Russian), my father in Latvian, German, and Russian. And they both learned English in the post-WWII refugee camps to prepare for starting over in their post-war life. The point is not that they were some ilk of conformist polyglots, rather, that in committing to learn the language of their new country they opened up economic opportunities for themselves and, in turn, subsequently contributed to the material success of their employers and society.

The situation for Latvia today is no different. Individual and societal economic prosperity demands standardization of communication. And the answer to that in a Western-facing Latvia is not the Russian language. Indeed, Putin’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine has turned Russia into an international pariah, and the learning of Russian in its neighboring states into an anathema.

It is well past overdue for Latvia’s non-Latvian speakers to make the choice and join mainstream society.

We wrote to the Apollo Group, 51% stake-holders in LIDO (since 2021), to inquire about their employee language policy. We will notify you of and share any reply we receive here.

Latvia’s “oppressed” Russians

I recently wound up in a still-ongoing Twitter argument about Kosovo, its history, and whether Serbs or Albanians have the more indigenous claim. Serbs are adamant Kosovo is Serbian land, that Albanians are interlopers. Indeed, that Albanians did not even exist as a people until the Ottoman Empire created them. (We note that if language is culture, Albanian is thought to be a millennium older than Serbian.)

The discussion inevitably descended into whataboutism. Who was I to discuss Kosovo when Latvians oppressed Russians?

You’re lying [that Russian propaganda about Latvia’s oppression of Russians is lies]! What Russian propaganda? When I was in Latvia a couple of months ago, Russians are literally second-class citizens. Not only that, they fear for their lives and must not say anything against the policies of your government. And then Putin is a dictator? and In Russia everyone has the same rights and we are allowed to criticize the government. [translated from Serbian]

More troubling than this false Russian narrative is that more than 30 years after fully restoring sovereignty, Latvians must learn Russian order to have any career opportunity. Even the LIDO restaurant chain conducts employee meetings in Russian because Russians still refuse to learn Latvian—and Latvians indulge them.

Our mailer editorial from September 2004 could have just as easily been written yesterday. From our archives:

Editorial, September 3, 2004

I read Boris Kagarlitsky’s thoughts on “A Common Baltic Future” [read article here] with great interest. I found, however, that they share a fundamental flaw with much of the analyses disseminated about the “problem” of Latvian Russians: that the Latvian nationalists fear the application of EU objectivity and norms because it will stop their abuse of Latvian Russians. That is the basis of Mr. Kagarlitsky’s alleged “paradox.”

Indisputably, Latvian nationalists look to EU membership to re-affirm the Baltics’ western European heritage—even under czarist Russia, the Baltics exercised a considerable degree of autonomy and remained western in outlook. A fundamental point which Mr. Kagarlitsky misses, however, is that Latvian nationalists also look to the EU for objectivity regarding the situation of Latvian Russians. They seek an effective counterbalance to Russia’s wide-ranging and ceaseless assault on the Baltics, from the Duma’s jingoistic pronouncements on human rights violations—the Baltics’ treatment of Russians is apparently more evil than the Russian army’s practice of exploding Chechen bodies to prevent identification—to the Duma’s resolutions that the Baltics joined the Soviet Union voluntarily and legally—and that to suggest otherwise is an anti-anti-fascist—i.e., Nazi—lie.

The true paradox is that Russia, as self-appointed proxy for Latvian Russians, does not seek EU objectivity. It rejects outright any objectivity that fails to fit its anti-Baltic agenda. The OSCE position on the validity of Latvia’s language laws is clear and indisputable; that position is now under frontal assault: Russia and its more oppressive CIS partners, in a joint declaration, recently took the OSCE to task for pointing out their human rights violations—the aforementioned exploding bodies, widening suppression of a free press, et al.—while turning a blind eye to atrocities committed daily in Estonia and Latvia.

Indeed, Mr. Kagarlitsky takes up Russia’s “blind eye” argument in his direct assertion that the Baltics are not being held to EU standards: “attempts by the Latvian government to drastically reduce the availability of Russian-language instruction in public schools flagrantly contradicts European norms,” and, “if the interests of minorities were a concern for Western politicians, Latvia and Estonia would not have been admitted to the EU until they had brought their laws in this area into line with European norms.” This EU-Baltic axis “consipiracy theory” plays well in domestic Russian politics and international posturing, but it is no more than Russian misdirection and misinformation taking on the guise of veracity by way of endless repetition.

If one scrutinizes minority language schooling within the EU, there is no simple declaration demanding such; rather, one finds a formalized process for preserving the languages of centuries-extant indigenous minorities evaluated and executed on a case by case basis. (In Latvia, this could apply to schooling in Liv or Latgalian.) Regardless, there is nothing in Latvia’s language policies which precludes Russian cultural instruction in Russian. As a parallel, I was born and grew up in New York, but attended Latvian school on the weekend, studying grammar, literature, history, and geography in my parents’ native language. Conversely, my parents learned English in order to fully participate in the life-blood of their new home.

And therein lies the true crux of the issue. The situation is not one of Latvians systematically attempting to wipe out the Russian language and culture—even every one of my relative says “Davai!” for “Okay!” It’s not the preservation of Russian that is at issue, it is Latvian Russian refusal to learn Latvian. There is a minority of Latvian Russians who:

  • continue to hold the Latvians and Latvian language in utter disdain;
  • continue to believe that Soviet preferential treatment of Russians versus Latvians is a natural state of entitlement;
  • and that denial of that entitlement is oppression.

When Russian journalists held their worldwide convention in Latvia in August, 2000, to discuss the state of Russians abroad, they expected to hold Latvia—the global epicenter of Russian minority abuse—accountable to the world. Instead, even Duma politicians in attendance freely admitted that what they found was far different from what Russian pronouncements and Latvian Russian “rights-advocates” had led them to expect.

Put bluntly, the refusal to learn Latvian by segments of its Russian minority is not a defiant act of Russian cultural preservation. It is a blatant effort to perpetuate perceived Russian supremacy through denial of the Latvian state. And therein, perhaps, we find the true motivation of the Russian Duma in its endless denouncements of the Baltic “situation”: its collective weltschmerz over how things are—independent autonomous Baltic states—and how it wishes they were—continued Soviet/Russian domination and state-paid vacations for Duma members to Jūrmala, the Latvian Riviera.

Boris Kagarlitsky (Russian: Бори́с Кагарли́цкий; born 29 August 1958) is a Russian Marxist theoretician and sociologist who has been a political dissident in the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia. He is coordinator of the Transnational Institute Global Crisis project and Director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements (IGSO) in Moscow. Kagarlisky hosts a YouTube channel “Rabkor,” associated with his online newspaper of the same name and with the IGSO. (Russia declared Kagarlisky and IGSO as “foreign agents” in 2021). [per Wikipedia]

Ruins of Bucha, Ukraine

Russia’s war on Ukraine

From its vodka — born of Ukrainian Cossack horilka, to its very origins as a culture — insisting Kievan Rus’ is Russian not Ukrainian, Russia has envied Ukraine and claimed it as its own. In truth, the Ukrainian and Russian cultures parted ways some 1,500 years ago. But since Putin has claimed Ukraine is neither a separate country nor culture, we first had to make it clear that his claim is false.

The origin of Putin’s full-scale war against Ukraine, however, is less one of cultural appropriation and more the culmination of a Russian campaign pre-dating Putin and originating prior to the dissolution of the USSR to

  • destabilize nascent democracies in the former Soviet orbit and, subsequently, to
  • re-integrate former Soviet territories back into Russia.

This campaign has been monumentally successful, spurred on in large part by three decades of minimal negative consequences to Russia for its territorial aggression against its neighbors.

Moldova’s Trans-Dniester — a template for aggression

February-March, 1990 — Moldova holds its first free parliamentary elections since having been joined to the USSR, Popular Front of Moldova wins landslide victory. Soviet loyalists “fear” Moldovan-Romanian reunification.

September 2, 1990 —  Russian-backed “separatist election” declares Moldova’s Trans-Dniester, aka Pridnestrovie (“by the Dniester”) or Transnistria, a strip of territory along the left bank of the Dniester river containing most of Moldova’s industrial assets, an independent republic.

November 2, 1990 — Armed conflict erupts in Dubăsari: pro-Transnistrian forces, including Transnistrian Republican Guard, militia and neo-Cossack units, and units of the Russian 14th Guards Army versus pro-Moldovan forces including Moldovan troops and police.

January 20, 1991 — Russian Black Beret OMON forces under the command of Vladimir Antyufeyev shoot freedom demonstrators in Rīga, Latvia, including killing cinematographer Andris Slapiņš by sniper fire.

August 19–22, 1991 — Soviet coup d’état attempts to remove Gorbachov from power, Antyufeyev is among the coup supporters; August 19th was the date Yeltsin stood on a tank in defiance.

September, 1991 — Viktor Alksnis sends Antyufeyev and his unit into Moldova to ensure successful breakaway of its Trans-Dniester region under Russian control.

December 1, 1991 — Igor Smirnov, Lenin wannabe complete with goatee, wins election as first “president” of Transnistria as residents simultaneously vote in a referendum to break away from Moldova. To “prove” victory, the PMR authorities show election results, every last person and who they voted for, to Pål Kolstø, Professor of Russian and Central European and Balkan Area Studies at the University of Oslo, who is horrified. Antyufeyev is appointed Minister of Security of Transnistria under the false name Vadim Shevstov.

December 25, 1991 — The hammer and sickle over the Kremlin comes down for the last time and the Russian tri-color goes up.

March, 1992 — Fighting escalates between Moldova and Transnistrian separatists.

Let us recount, for example, the events of the first days of March [1992], that had catalyzed the spring confrontation at Dubossary. In the night of the 3rd of March a tragedy occurred in the Grigoriopol region. Bandits gunned down an ambulance car that carried a pregnant woman to a hospital. A midwife was killed and the driver, the woman and other passengers were wounded as a result.
Smirnov blamed the deed on Moldovan volunteers and declared the state of emergency in the Dubossary district. The 6th of March 1992 was declared “Black Friday”, and on the central street of the city a [public] funeral was held for the dead. Smirnov was either insincere, or didn’t know the whole truth himself [because] the ambulance car with the pregnant woman was gunned down by Transnistrian security officers and former members of the Riga OMON: V. Nikitenko and S. Bubnov. The assignment was given to the executioners by their commander, Vadim Shevtsov [Antyufeyev], personally. R Sabirov, a witness to this heinous crime, told this to A.I. Lebed of it in 1993, and later recounted it on TV “ASKET”. [Lebed was commander of the Russian 14th Guards Army occupying Transnistria.] — translated from ВОЖДЬ В ЧУЖОЙ СТАЕ, by Mikhail Bergman

Fighting, interrupted by periodic ceasefires, lasts until a final ceasefire in July, 1992.

The Kremlin conducts a massive disinformation campaign to portray the Transnistrian regime as legitimate. (Read Edward Lucas’s two part series on Transnistria here and here.) Moldovan industry is privatized into the hands of Russian oligarchs, and despite acceding to multiple agreements to leave, Russian military still occupies the territory as “peacekeepers” today.

June 12, 1999 — British NATO forces at Pristina disobey orders to engage Russians and chest-thump to this day that they prevented WWIII. Putin, appointed as an acting PM less than two months later (August 9) and president at year end (December 31), takes the lesson to heart: NATO will never attack Russians or Russia itself in fear of precipitating WWIII.

How is Moldova relevant to Ukraine today?

Moldova established the model for intervention which Russia has used ever since: in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Ukraine’s Crimea, Donbas and Luhansk; and now in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

  1. Stage elections = false proof of the Russophone “Russian compatriot” populace’s desire to leave non-Russian state
  2. Stage incidents = false accusations and/or false flag operations against the non-Russian state of terrorism, genocide,…against Russophones
  3. Cite #1 and/or #2 as the basis for “humanitarian” intervention to protect Russophones
  4. Manufacture “news” and diplomacy campaign associated with the justification of territorial break-away and of subsequent Russian protectionist intervention.

Completing the Moldova-Ukraine connection, 23 years after killing freedom demonstrators in Latvia, 22 years after killing innocents to precipitate martial law in Transnistria, Vladimir Antyufeyev is named “Deputy Prime Minister” of Donetsk in 2014 as the neo-Soviet Kremlin moves forward with its next operation against Ukraine having completed Crimea’s annexation. (The true results of the referendum to join Russia were accidentally released, then withdrawn, indicating less than 25% support to join Russia.)

A step too far

When Russia claims the heritage of Kievan Rus’ as its own, it also claims Sviatoslav I, who overextended his campaign of territorial acquisition, prematurely moving his capital southward to today’s Romania. The Pechenegs assassinated him in 972 and fashioned his skull into a drinking goblet.

Since Crimea, Putin has been cremating Russian dead in eastern Ukraine using mobile crematoria, eliminating evidence of direct Russian involvement. Families of the dead are threatened to never speak of their lost ones who “volunteered.” But by launching full-out war against Ukraine, Putin, too, has overextended himself and can no longer cover up Russian losses. Thousands will come home in body bags — unless Putin leaves them to rot in Ukraine’s streets and fields.

When, not if, the Russian offensive grinds to a halt, we might expect Putin to declare his “punitive” campaign concluded and withdraw forces back to eastern Ukraine as “peacekeepers”, and seek to make that situation permanent in “peace” talks with Ukraine. One can hope the Russian people will finally rise up and cast off the centuries-old yoke of despotic rule by which the rest of the world judges Russia and Russians, and Putin becomes the last of the Sviatoslavs. Regardless, Ukraine will not agree to ceding any of its sovereign territory to Russia.

The alternative, that Putin achieves total victory, then kills or jails/deports all of Ukraine’s leadership a la the USSR and the Baltics in WWII, and moves on to his next conquest in central-eastern Europe is one our faith in Ukraine and democracy cannot permit.

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