Latvia and the Latvians — National Attitudes (Part C)

The Latvians are a small people, ethnically distinct from their neighbors except for the Lithuanians. For centuries they have maintained their distinctiveness in spite of assimilative efforts by their German and Russian overlords. The development of an intelligentsia in the latter half of the nineteenth century coincided with a period of rapid industrial development, resulting in the formation of both nationalist and socialist-internationalist trends. During the Russian Civil War the Latvians became even more divided amongst themselves — pro-Communists against anti-Communists — than were the Estonians or Lithuanians. The establishment of the independent Latvian republic isolated most pro-Bolshevik Latvians, however, and Stalin's purges decimated those Latvians who lived in the USSR. There were few native Communists with strong local ties left by the time Latvia became part of the Soviet Union. Oriented toward west-central Europe by their heritage of Germanic culture, religion, alphabet, and historic trade ties, the Baltic peoples are the most Westernized portion of the Soviet population and have served as a major channel for the introduction of Western ideas and fashions into the Soviet Union. [1] Their higher level of economic development and welfare, both at the time of incorporation into the Soviet Union and at present, combines with this background to produce an environment in which the Latvians may well feel themselves superior to the Russians and other Slavs. [2]

The incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet Union occurred within the lifetime of almost 60% of its present population. [3] Despite the fact that Soviet historiography has slowly eliminated references to the significant roles played by the "changed international circumstances" (a euphemism for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) and by the Red Army, the Sovietization of Latvia was neither free nor voluntary. In fact, it led to the deportation of most of its political leaders and a major portion of its mobilized and educated population, as well as to considerable emigration. This traumatic series of events left many Latvians with relatives in the West, a factor which has led the Soviet regime to make unceasing efforts to counter and discredit the information and political activities of the exiles. [4]

The Soviet period of Latvian history has seen a continued large immigration of Russians and other Slavs into the republic. This has significantly reduced the predominance of ethnic Balts in the population, especially in the cities. A great deal of this immigration was connected with the re-establishment of heavy industry in Latvia, and some natives have argued that a primary purpose of such industrialization was to provide for the importation of Russians. [5]

The small size and slow growth of the native contingent in the CPL have meant that political power in the republic was and continues to be exercised by Russians and by imports of Latvian origin who had long been resident in Russia and who speak Latvian imperfectly. This leadership has resisted the tendency to become "re-nationalized" and to act as a buffer between Moscow and national communists that seems to have prevailed in Estonia. [6] They remain close to the Moscow line, perhaps influenced by the rise of one of their number, Arvids Pelshe, to the Chairmanship of the CPSU Party Control Committee. The one attempt of native communists to gain influence and to speak out for republic and national interests was crushed in 1959. [7]

The attitudes of Latvians today toward the Soviet system in general and toward the future of their nation in particular are of course difficult to deter mine. Most information has to be gleaned from official publications, private communications, and the reports of visitors. Latvian participation in samizdat has been relatively small, especially in comparison to the activities of Estonians, Lithuanians, and the Jewish population of Riga. The latter group has played a conspicuous role in the current Jewish awakening in the Soviet Union. Such sources do, however, provide many indications that the Latvians are concerned — perhaps increasingly so — about the preservation of their national culture.

The leadership of the Latvian CP has frequently attacked any expression of nationalist feelings and "political immaturity" thereby demonstrating the persistence of such feelings. Cina criticized the Union of Writers and Artists in September of 1970 for not giving sufficient attention to the "ideological growth" of its members. The 1972 Congress of the Latvian Komsomol also heard criticism of poor political education work among young writers. [8] The existence of cultural nationalism and a desire on the part of young Latvian writers to revaluate those parts of the Latvian literary heritage that have been denigrated by the Soviets has been documented by Rolfs Ekmanis of Arizona State University. [9]

Augusts Voss, First Secretary of the CPL, has repeatedly castigated survivals of bourgeois nationalism among the population. [10] The publication of an official rebuttal — a highly inadequate one — to the so-called "Letter of 17 Latvian Communists," is evidence of the interest created by this letter when it was re-broadcast to Latvia by Radio Liberty. [11]

1. Rein Taagepera, 1972. For a Soviet viewpoint, see Vasi1i Aksenov, A Ticket To The Stars (N.Y. Signet Books, 1963), passim.
2. King, 1968: 62. For a similar sentiment among Lithuanians, see Soviet Analyst (November), 1972: I: 18: 4.
3. Sovetskaya Latviya (June 23), 1971.
4. E.G. see Cina (February 24), 1972, wherein the exiled Social Democratic leader Dr. Bruno Kalnins is accused of forging the "Letter of 17 Latvian Communists"; and Radio Liberty Dispatch, Dissidents Among the National Minorities in the USSR (August 29), 1972: 4.
5. See "Nationality Problems: Latvia," Soviet Analyst (March 2), 1972: I: 1: 4.
6. Taagepera, 1972: 7-9.
7. On the events of 1959 see the section on nationa1ism.
8. Cina, September 15, 1970; March 3, 1972. Sovietskaya Latviya (March 10), 1973, repeats criticism of this kind and directly connects it to nationalism. Translated in FBIS (March 19), 1973: FBIS -SOV-73-53: III: J2-J5.
9. Ekmanis, 1972: 59-60, 66.
10. See, for example, his articles in Pravda (March 20), 1971, and in Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye (June), 1972. The latter was quoted in Radio Liberty Dispatch (August 20), 1972: 4. Also see his speech to the XXI Congress of the CPL, Sovetskaya Latviya (February 26), 1971 (FBIS No. 55, Supp. 11, March 22, 1971, especially pages 60-61).
11. Soviet Analyst (April 13), 1972: Vol 1: 4: 4, (April 13, 1972). Private communications in Riga in June, 1963 indicated a belief that the "Letter" could have originated locally.

Rein Taagepera of the University of California at Irvine has written that "resistance to the regime has been sporadic, varied, and possibly slowly increasing in all Baltic republics." [1] He is less sanguine about the future of the Latvian nation, however, and concludes that it is in greater danger of assimilation than its neighbors. This is in large part due to the ever-increasing Russian population and the lack of support and protection from its own Party elite.

A major study of attitudes and social behavior in the area of national relations was conducted between 1964 and 1969 by a group of Soviet scholars led by A.I. Kholmogorov. His data showed a strong trend toward the growth of "international features" among the population of Latvia. but with some interesting variations. For example. although census data show that a great many use Russian at work, only 7.4% of the Latvians use Russian in the home. [2] Two-thirds of the Latvians surveyed said that they had friends from among other nationalities, a figure significantly below the 86% average for the non-Latvian residents of the republic. [3] Latvians were also noticeably less favorable to the idea of multinational work collectives than were the others, were less likely to have visited another Soviet Republic, and showed a stronger preference for their national culture. [4]

Other Soviet studies. including one by the ethnographer L. Terent'eva have shown a marked increase in the frequency of mixed marriages in the city of Riga, from 30% in 1948 to 36% in 1963. Janis Vitols has reported that 38% of the marriages in Riga in 1970 were between people of different nationalities. [5] The publication of Terent'eva's results in the Latvian journal Zinatne un Tekhnika in 1970 apparently caused some commotion. as that issue of the journal was almost immediately withdrawn from public circulation. [6] Kholmogorov's sample of several different parts of Latvia, however, indicated that Latvians were less prone to enter mixed marriages than were representatives of other nationalities. Only slightly over 11% of the Latvians he surveyed had made such marriages, vs. approximately a third of the Russian population.

Under Soviet law, the children of such marriages have the opportunity to choose the nationality of either one of their parents as their own for their internal passports. In Riga, the children of Latvian-Russian marriages showed a tendency to prefer Latvian registration 57% to 43%. Children of marriages between Latvians and members of other nationalities chose Latvian with even greater frequency. [7]

Such studies, though inconclusive, do tend to show that nationalist feelings and particularism have. not disappeared among the Latvians. Although they have not been manifested in illegal dissent as frequently as among the other Baltic peoples, there have been other kinds of activities which will be discussed in the next section.

1. Taagepera, 1972: 9.
2. Kholmogorov, 1970: 119. 121.
3. Ibid.: 175.
4. Ibid.: 172. 180. 185.
5. Nauka i tekhnika (February) 1972: 32-35.
6. The article is .translated. with a commentary. in King. 1970. See also Terenteva's article in Sovetskaya etnografya. 1969: 3: 20-30.
7. Zinatne un tekhnika (August), 1970: 8: 12.

As Anthony Astrakhan, former Moscow correspondent for the Washington Post, wrote in 1970, "Nationalism in Estonia and neighboring Latvia is easy for a visitor to sense but hard to document. What you see with your eyes is more a wish for cultural autonomy than a plan or dream of seceding from the Soviet Union." [1] This observation seems to be more true for Latvia than for Estonia, where the Khronika [Chronicle] has reported the existence of an organized national movement. Still, a number of Latvians have been involved in illegal dissent in recent years. Teataja, an Estonian émigré journal, reported the trial of seven young Latvian writers and literary critics in May-June of 1968. [2] Soviet underground channels carried reports of the arrest of ten persons who had gathered at the grave of Janis Cakste, the first President of independent Latvia, on the 1969 anniversary of their Declaration of Independence, November 18. [3] In February 1971, three young Latvians were sentenced to prison terms for distributing anti-Soviet leaflets. [4]

It is possible that Latvians are among the self-styled "Democrats of Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States" who have authored two major pieces of samizdat literature. The Memorandum of this group, published abroad in December 1970, mentions Latvians among the "hundreds" who have been imprisoned or advocating the secession of their republics from the Soviet Union. [5]

The most important document to have emerged from Latvia today is the "Letter of 17 Latvian Communists," (further referred to as Letter). which appeared in the West in January, 1972. Although its authors are unknown, as are the channels by which it reached the West, this document is widely held to be authentic. [6] In the Letter, the authors identify themselves as long-time Party members, all of whom were born in Latvia. Most of them appear to have formerly been Party undergrounders in bourgeois Latvia, who had become convinced that Leninism was being used consciously and deliberately as a screen for Great-Russian chauvinism. They recall that at the June, 1953 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPL, the Russian domination of the Latvian Party and its apparat was criticized as a distortion of the Leninist nationalities policy. The "thaw" lasted only a short time, however (it apparently reflected Beria's attempt to gain power in the Party by winning the support of the non-Russian cadres [7]), and Russification was resumed "ever more obtrusively and purposefully." The Letter then describes several aspects of that policy: 1) Russian control of the Second Secretary and Cadres Secretary posts; 2) importation of both construction workers and permanent labor for large new factories; 3) location of major military bases and All-Union health resorts in Latvia; 4) Russian domination of many government departments (65% of the doctors in the city health services are said not to speak Latvian, which causes "crude errors in diagnoses and the prescription of remedies"); 5) use of Russian for two-thirds of all radio and television broadcasts; and 6) insistence on conducting meetings in Russian even if there is only one Russian in the group. The authors conclude: "Ever thing national is being eliminated. Forced assimilation is being practiced. Peoples, cultures, and traditions do not have equal rights."

As one example of attempts by natives to resist this policy (others are implied but not described), the Letter recounts the Berklavs affair in 1959, when a majority of the members of the Latvian Politburo began to support him in opposing Russification. Khruschev himself came to Latvia and oversaw Berklavs' dismissal. In the purge that followed, CPL First Secretary, J. Kalnberzins, was kicked upstairs to be Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Premier V. Lacis was removed, as were two other Central Committee CPL Secretaries, the Chairman of the Republic Trade Union, the editor of Cina, the First Secretary and several other members of the Riga City committee, the First and Second Secretaries of the Latvian Komsomol, and numerous other Party and government officials. According to the Letter, "today only foreigners and those Latvians who have lived all their lives in Russia and appeared in Latvia only after the Second World War work in leadership positions." [8]

After the Voice of America broadcast of the content of the Letter to the USSR, both the Russian and Latvian press organs of the CC CPL printed a rebuttal which failed to confront any of the major charges directly. Instead it concentrated on accusing émigrés of forging the letter and countered with information not related to the points raised in it.[138] The obvious inadequacy of the rebuttal points to the truth of the accusations and reveals the leadership's concern over the continued existence of nationalism in Latvia.

1. Washington Post (December 11), 1970.
2. Cited in Estonian Events (December), 1968: 11: 1.
3. Anthony Astrakhan, Washington Post (December 11), 1970.
4. Latvian Information Bulletin (Latvian Legation, Washington, D.C.), (October), 1971: 4: 13.
5. Myroslav Prokop, 1971; "Translations on USSR Political and Social Affairs," JPRS (December 9), 1971: 193: 4.
6. Briviba, (January), 1972: 1 (225): 2-4; New York Times (February 27), 1972; Duevel, 1972; Soviet Analyst (March 2), 1972: I: 1: 3-6.
7. See especially Duevel, 1972.
8. For additional references to the Berk1avs affair, see the section on demography.
9. Soviet Analyst (April 13), 1972: 1: 4: 4-6.