Briedis — Chapter 3

Battle at Veiss homestead...and a grave injury

he 1st Daugavgrīva Battalion remained in service under the 12th Siberian Division until 16 March 1916. Turn and turn about the units of the battalion would carry out a reconnaissance at night or they would remain in reserve, engaged in intensive training. The Germans behind the Misa had fortified their positions and now it was more difficult to take prisoners.

On the night of 13 March Briedis again tried to break into the Veiss homestead to pick up some prisoners. The company had stealthily crept up to the wire fence and volunteers had already all but rushed out to cut a path when the Russian artillery opened fire prematurely; the Germans caught sight of the attackers and opened a ferocious fire. The attack was not going to achieve the success hoped for, so Briedis ordered a withdrawal. Six riflemen were wounded. Once again Briedis became convinced that artillery fire can throw into confusion plans which depend on secrecy and, along with that, ruin the whole enterprise. The fault did not lie with the artillery alone — a rifleman could throw a grenade too soon. After 16 March the battalion was transferred to the 13th Siberian Division.

The year 1915 had ended, the Russians as well as the German front-lines had stabilised and passed to a war of positions. Were the pressure on the Western Allies to become too strong they would exert pressure on us to go over to the attack. But the Russians too from the beginning of spring 1916 wanted to go over to the offensive although previous experience had shown that the Russians were better suited to the trenches than to the open field.

On the morning of 20 March Lt.-Col. Francis, the commander of the 2nd battalion, was entrusted with the joint command of both battalions, which protected the left flank of the 51st Regiment. He was to occupy the exit position between the Ķekava river and the Bauska highway until 5 o'clock on the 21st and, when the Siberian regiment began its attack after an artillery preparation, towards Franci, Gugi, Villas. At night reconnaissance patrols were to gather information or to sabotage the barbed wire.

29 Bangerskis described the subsequent events in this way: 'For several days beforehand, taking advantage of the fairly frequent morning mist, Briedis and I carried out a reconnaissance to find out the most favourable approach. Unfortunately such an approach was virtually not to be found. In part we might use the highway ditch, but that was full of frozen snow. To clean it out now would mean attracting the attention of the enemy. We decided that it could probably be done shortly before the start of the attack. I decided to attack with two companies in the first wave and with the remaining two in support, advancing along behind. Each group had its own good points and bad points. And, taking note of the excellent performance of the first company, I wished to give Briedis the opportunity to choose; but he answered that it should be carried out just as ordered. He also spoke out against choosing who were to be named as company commanders by lot. After Briedis' statement and his efforts at clearing the snow from the highway ditch. I saw that he would willingly go in the first wave, if such were the orders, but he himself shunned the drawing of lots . . . So I then ordered the 1st and 2nd companies to be allocated to first wave.

'On the morning of 21 March a hurricane barrage by the Russian artillery began all along the front. This flattened the strongpoint, the goal of the battalion's attack. Straightaway the German artillery began to reply. When the artillery duel had lasted for about 15-20 minutes the attack went in.

'Wishing to exchange a few words with Briedis before the battle, I went to look for him as the fire of our artillery started up. I found him alone with his runner in a very small bunker where you could only lie prone or take up a sitting position. Briedis was in the lying position with his hands covering his face. If I had not known Briedis so well, I might have thought that he was in a dreadful state of panic before the battle. In reality what Briedis was doing in this tiny little dug-out, was sinking himself in meditation and giving himself up to the power of the one who decides our fates. I knew that Briedis had given himself up to a diligent study of the science of yoga and to the demands both of a physical and psychic nature which it makes of one, particularly at decisive moments in one's life.

'Shortly before the Russian fire lifted from the wire to the trenches, Briedis' riflemen were actively clearing the snow from the ditch along which the 1st company and also Briedis were to pass. The 2nd company went to the left, using a dip in the ground. The capture of the first line of communication trenches now made the attack easier.30 They advanced along these with hand grenades and managed to win back one line of bunkers after another, and one bunker after another. The attack in the sector of the 2nd battalion was also successful and by midday all the strong-points were in Latvian hands. The losses in the attack were not severe; the most grievous fact was that Briedis was among the wounded. The Germans, when all was said and done, had rebuilt the position in this as in those other sectors attacked on 21 March; attacks there had little success right from the start. The losses in the whole operation were very heavy: in the first company all the officers, senior-sergeants and instructors were put out of action. The losses of the whole battalion came to: three officers dead and 109 instructors and men; seven officers wounded (three seriously, among them Briedis) and 203 instructors and soldiers; missing -27.'

So, the battalion was short of ten officers and 339 other ranks on the second day after this battle, which was the first in which they were given the standard combat tasks, operating as part of a larger unit and not in a reconnaissance role as had initially been envisaged. That Briedis looked on this without enthusiasm, even if he carried out his orders to the letter, would seem to emerge from what the battalion commander said . . . The battalion's gains were 20 prisoners, one searchlight and a drum of telephone wire. Briedis had gone to Lt.-Col. Francis' HQ, where he sketched the situation (speaking was impossible); he then received first aid and was conveyed to the Riflemen's hospital at Riga.

It turned out that the bullet had hit his left cheek, and smashed the jaw and, breaking up, had gone out through the jaw in three places. The operation was difficult especially because it had to be performed without anaesthetic. Dr Jankovskis said: 'Rarely have I seen a man who suffered the greatest pain in this way. Briedis is not only a great soldier but he is great in other ways.'

Always instructing the troops

The soldiers of Briedis' old regiment, the 99th, sent him a letter:

'Your excellency!12

Our hearts were touched when we read in the papers of your heroic deeds. On receiving news of your being wounded, we send you our sincere wishes for your speedy recovery. May the beautiful, free crown of just toil grow up on the spot where your blood has been shed in this sacred fashion.

The Ivangorod Regiment Soldiers' Society.'

31 Briedis was very pleased with this greeting. Living with Latvian soldiers, not only his own company and battalion, the whole of Latvian society was for Briedis what it had not been for any other. Did this leave any impression on him? March had brought him a splendid present, perhaps the greatest experience he had had for some time: on 9 March a son was born to him who received the name Juris, from the name of his father's high award.3 Briedis received promotion to the rank of captain-lieutenant and captain.4 The number of Latvian battalions had now increased to eight active and one reserve.

Briedis hurried back to his battalion, still not fully healed. There again, investigating and examining what was new, carrying out experiments with explosive charges, Briedis got himself burned and was compelled once more to spend some time undergoing treatment in hospital. Was it perhaps in hospital, while Latvian battalions were doubling and expanding into two-battalion regiments, that the idea came to Briedis of some great Latvian undertaking? Bangerskis strives to make the case. Yet, no matter from whom or whence the suggestion came for the Latvians to have a chance to break into the German position, if this was to be prepared and carried out as a surprise, then Briedis undeniably believed in this and was involved in its preparation.

Briedis' fame was widely known. Nor could it have escaped the notice of his old military academy. K. Bumanis remembered that in one class on tactics the tutor had said the words: 'Somewhere on the northern front the pride of our academy Lt. Briedis is fighting. Read the newspaper accounts of the battles he has been involved in and learn how great successes can be obtained with few losses.' Briedis and also a few other Latvian officers were sent in the autumn of 1915 to the military academy to give talks on their experiences. A. Skrodelis said: 'Every day we were gathered together in the lecture theatre, Captain Briedis came in accompanied by a Russian general who was commandant of the College. 'We talked about the battles in which the Latvians had been involved. He would deftly sketch out on the board the plans of the battle positions; in a lively narrative he brought these plans to life, enthusing about them . . . At the end of the lecture the school commandant expressed his thanks, spoke approvingly of Briedis and stressed the fact that the Vladimir Military Academy was proud that Briedis, who now as an officer had become an example to many,32 had grown up in its family. Turning to us, the general finished: 'this captain was once in this room just as you are. So when you leave this school you should follow in his footsteps.'

Briedis stood there timidly, with his eyes lowered. From his face, standing thus, there radiated simplicity; but it was exactly this simplicity and shyness which made him so attractive. Later, in our own rooms we hung around for a good time discussing this captain who was so simple, without any pose or conceit. Someone thoughtfully said: 'Perhaps all real officers and heroes are like this.'

'Briedis gave lectures in all the main Petrograd military academies. In the Pavlovskoe Uchilishche6 two Russian cadets asked Briedis to help them to join Latvian regiments after completing the academy.

It is not possible to retrace all Briedis' activities, not only through lack of space in the journals but also because of the limitations of the material. An officer's work and his duties do not only consist of the preparation and carrying out of battlefield tasks, but also of the countless trivial problems facing him on which the major things depend. Briedis had been a company commander in the Latvian Riflemen for a considerable time, and this post was the most difficult in the Russian army. The company commander was responsible to the regiment for everything but, however conscientious he might be, he could at best strive so that his command was in the best possible state. The training, clothing, victualling and billeting of his company and, likewise, all expenditure (for service purposes or private) - all had to pass through the company commander. Similarly he was the one on whom the fate of his subordinates most closely depended, for example in cases of unwarranted absence because of a disease brought on by the proximity to home and the longing to be there. More than one of those who had gone missing for a short time - be it for days or even weeks - reported back to his company commander, causing quite a lot of trouble before the matter was settled, both so that he should remain unpunished and so he should be saved from what did not fit our circumstances. It may be that Briedis had fewer such cases, but he could not have completely avoided them.

With the conversion of the 1st Daugavgriva Battalion into a two battalion regiment,7 Briedis was appointed commander of the first battalion of the new regiment on 13 November. Normally he would have a lighter load than he would have had as a company commander,33 even if he was not managing four companies instead of one. But this was not so for Briedis. He was also burdened by tasks outside his normal duties. As K. Bumanis said: 'Before the Christmas battles additional courses in tactical training were organised for the officers and Briedis was one of the tutors. Russians on these courses as well as the other tutors were surprised by the breadth of knowledge possessed by Briedis concerning the situation on the northern front, particularly with regard to the German fortifications and the possibility of capturing them.' The writer was present when Briedis showed the Vidzeme Regiment how to cut through the wire entanglements making as little noise as possible. A wire-cutting group in white overalls demonstrated what Briedis had been saying. He showed how if one cut in the usual way the squeaking of the shears and the cut bits of the wire fence falling down and knocking against the other bits of the wire fence would make quite an audible noise, particularly in the silence of the night. He showed how one could avoid this if one of the cutters held the wire in both gloved hands as the second cut the wire between these gloves; after this the first would silently lower the cut ends of wire. It seemed a slow job, but a trained cutter did it very deftly and quickly in just this way so that nothing could be heard.

Christmas battles and aftermath

In my mind also remained Briedis' closing words, that one should not believe the German to be some sort of superman. He is the same kind of man as the rest of humanity, no wiser, no stronger, no braver. To cope with him was not all that difficult if one realised this and felt superior - as indeed one was, for example, when attacking a surprised enemy, for the attacker dictates the action to be taken. In the preparation for the Christmas battles, General Goppers also mentioned the astounding work performed by Briedis in cutting through the enemy wire, saying that Briedis had put forward the idea of smashing through the enemy without artillery support. P. Dardzans has said that after the battles of July 1916 a certain ensign Malcenieks appeared in the 1st battalion and was assigned to Dardzans (third) company. Malcenieks had been a great poacher from childhood, which required stealth, boldness and agility, and for that reason he became an enthusiastic and active practitioner of the techniques to bring Briedis' plans to fruition. With a large selection to choose from, he mainly formed his wirecutting groups from the third company. In preparing for the attack this is what happened in the first battalion: in 1916,34 already well into the autumn, the corps commander turned up in Kukuļmuiža8 (if I am not mistaken it was General Boldyrev) and, and when night fell, Malcenieks' wire-cutting group demonstrated for him the techniques of cutting through wire by stealth. And they did indeed prove that the 'enemy' company, even if it knew beforehand that the wire was going to be cut, still did not notice the exact spot and the exact time. The validity of this method was then officially accepted.

'Approximately two weeks before the Christmas battles, a group of officers of the first battalion of the regiment and the leading wire-cutters with Briedis at their head made for the sector of the front to the east of Mangaji to reconnoitre the sector where the attack was to take place. Dressed in white overalls, we (some ten men at least) stopped in a small coppice of birch and osier about three hundred yards from the German trenches. It was midday and, even if cloudy, daylight. The German trenches and the strongpoint of Mangaļi with all their wire entanglements could be seen as if in the palm of one's hands. Briedis, under his breathe explained the intended operation, pointing out where the gaps had to be made and where the charges were to be placed. After about ten minutes we completed our reconnaissance and returned to the Russian lines.

'Again on 22 December we (several officers and wire-cutters) walked once again in daylight, to the same spot in front of the German trenches to refresh our memories about the local contours and to give Briedis the opportunity to give some additional instructions.'

More has been written about the Christmas battles than about any other. The fullest and most objective analysis seems to be that of General Penikis which draws comprehensively on sources.

In order that the 1st Daugavgrīva regiment could reach the sector of the attack at the appointed time (5 o'clock on 23 December/5 January), Briedis had ordered his own 1st and 3rd companies to send forward wire-cutters by 1.30. The 3rd company, under the command of Malcenieks, had by 4.30 cut a sufficiently wide path; the cutters of the 1st company, however, had been noticed by the enemy, and for that reason they had to interrupt their cutting until the enemy had quietened down. The start of the attack had thus to be postponed by 20 minutes and the path in the 1st company's sector widened by four delayed-action pyroxiline charges. The Germans became confused by the explosion and 35 broke off their firing. Captain Briedis fired off three red flares as a signal for the beginning of the attack and for the artillery support.

The Daugavgrīva companies went forward at the run but the path for the Kurzeme 1st battalion had not been sufficiently well prepared and the men had to squeeze through the wire one at a time. The Daugavgrivans went along the 3rd company's path through the wire comparatively quickly and burst into the German trenches. But just at this place the Germans had a great number of dug-outs, from which the half-dressed Germans ran into the open, engaging us in hand-to-hand combat or firing at us from the dug-outs. These had to be cleared with hand grenades. The front companies of the 2nd Riga also rushed forward.

Having captured the area with the great concentration of dug-outs the 1st regiment pushed on further, but the Germans had hurriedly organised their resistance from a trench further back. We also needed to silence a German battery which was firing from Mangaļi on the flank of the attackers. Briedis directed a part of his battalion against it for the occupation of Mangaļi was not going as expected and the 5th regiment of the 2nd brigade, which was to attack on the other side of Mangaļi, had not moved forward at all. Around 8 o'clock, despite the enemy's stubborn resistance and frequent counter-attacks, the 1st brigade's units had pushed the Germans out of the first and second line of trenches, as well as from Mangaļi. About 9 o'clock the German heavy battery had been captured and so as not to allow the enemy any chance to reorganise, Briedis ordered the companies of his battalion to advance in the direction of Skangaļi (already more than a kilometre deep into the enemy position). Here too several units of the 2nd and 3rd regiments had joined up. At the beginning of this attack Briedis had been severely wounded, which had had a bad effect on the further activity of the Skangaļi groups. Still, even before midday they had taken Skangaļi.

P. Dardzans, commander of the first battalion after Briedis had been wounded and who had been a dose observer of Briedis' activities in this battle, wrote: 'Briedis' most brilliant achievements were at the beginning of the Christmas battles. The Latvian 1st brigade broke into the German lines using tactical methods worked out by Briedis. He was at the head of his battalion which, almost without losses, broke through the first German lines. All the regiments of the 1st brigade followed his battalion. It was a brilliant 36 achievement. Just four hours after the start of the battle Briedis was severely wounded; it is possible that a German sniper hit him from some hiding-place in some dark, tall fir-tree.

Of course, being at the head of his battalion is not always to be taken literally - in such a case Briedis would hardly be in a position to command - and means rather that he was everywhere necessary to be able to see everything and to watch over everything.

In the Christmas battles the intended aim of the Latvians was not achieved - the occupation of Jelgava. The way in which the operation developed, full success could not be hoped for. But we gained the glory and were also appraised of what Bangerskis had warned in our growing from regiment to brigade: larger units would be expected to perform more important tasks and not at all those for which we were best suited; we might also incur greater losses, for which we did not have adequate replacements. The effect of losses would also be greater in just this sense. But one must also not forget that the losses on the German side in this month of continuous fighting had been considerable, and that their men had become extremely exhausted and at least one division which had been assigned to the Western Front had been seriously weakened and its dispatch there delayed.

On 3 February 1917 both the Russians and the Germans reverted once more to positional warfare. The 12th Army in these battles (despite losses of approximately 23,000 men dead, wounded and missing) could regard itself with pride. If the eighteen months of vicious combat had not until now led to a breakthrough on this front and no guns had been captured, then in these very Christmas battles (of 23 December- 2 January/5-15 January) the Latvian rifle regiments had successfully achieved this in two places, and together with the 53rd Siberian regiment had captured 32 guns and about 800 prisoners, not counting other trophies. Also as a result of a long month of combat they had brought about a remarkable improvement in their positions. The guns and prisoners, paraded through the city, had until then been a still unparalleled sight, and one which created a strong impression.

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1	In the old Tsarist army before the First World War the officers were usually drawn from the gentry and also the nobility. The terms of address used are typical of a strongly hierarchical society. There are three Russian expressions which may be rendered as 'excellency' in English. The army which entered the war in 1914, had, of course, been enormously expanded, and the officer corps included a much wider range of backgrounds, of which Briedis was an example but the habits of deference did not change straightaway.—D.G. (original footnote)
2	Original Latvian reads "Your Highest Nobility!"
3	Juris = Russian 'Iurii'.—D.G. (original footnote)
4	Captain-Lieutenant. At first this sounds like a naval rank equivalent to German Kapitan-Leutnant. A more likely explanation has been suggested: that it is another anachronistic survival of eighteenth century practice. In other words it was an appointment, not a rank. The individual in question held the substantive rank of Lieutenant but looked after the company of the Colonel of the regiment or of one of the majors. Briedis was soon after made up to full captain when a vacancy became available.—D.G. (original footnote)
5	"Zvaigžņu pulka aizmirdza"
6	A senior military academy in Petrograd.—D.G. (original footnote)
7	That is, the battalion would be split: two of its companies going to one of the new battalions, two to the other. It would probably be brought up to regimental strength by drafts for Briedis is described as managing four companies instead of one. Later in the war a triangular system was adopted by all combatants: 3 companies = 1 battalion, 3 battalions = 1 regiment.—D.G. (original footnote)
8	Kukulis manor.