latviski
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE U.S.S.R.
and
POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE BALTIC STATES,
1920-1927
In spite of the political and economic advantages accruing to them from their Peace Treaties with the U.S.S.R., the Baltic States, so far from pursuing a real peace policy towards the U.S.S.R., continued their hostility and not only did they permit preparation on their territory for attacks on the U.S.S.R., but in some cases actual attacks were made.
Finland
The Peace Treaty with Finland signed October 14, 1920, carne into force on January 1, 1921 ; only ten months later, in October, 1921, the Finnish Government organised an attack on Soviet Karelia. The Note of the Soviet Government of November 16, 1921, stated that : “ Bandit detachments which had gathered and armed themselves on Finnish territory, under the command of Finnish officers and with the help of the Finnish authorities, invaded the most sparsely, populated and roadless section of Karelia in October and entered the Tungud Volost ” (district).
On the territory of Finland an organisation calling itself “ The Karelian Government ” was formed openly and with the goodwill of the Finnish authorities. Further, a society for “ humanitarian ” help for Karelians was formed, which took upon itself the task of sending supplies to the Finnish detachments which had broken into Karelia. In the Finnish papers summaries from the front were published daily. In a number of populated centres of Finland recruiting bureaus functioned openly for the formation of detachments of Karelian “ rebels.” Officers of the Finnish army received fictitious leave and went to Karelia.
Soviet armed forces repulsed the Finnish detachments which had invaded Karelia and forced them to recross the Finnish-Soviet frontier.
In spite of the unprecedented character of this
attack only ten
months after the Peace Treaty had come into force, the Soviet
Government immediately after having put an end to the Karelian
adventure, offered the Finnish Government negotiations for the
conclusion of a special agreement regarding the inviolability of the
frontiers. Such an agreement, establishing a special neutral zone
along the frontier and providing for other guarantees, was signed
June 1, 1922, but it did not put a stop to the hostile activity of the Finnish
Government and the systematic violation of the Soviet-Finnish frontier. Attacks
on Soviet territory by armed bands from Finland did not cease. On October 3, 1922,
the Soviet Government addressed a demand to the Finnish Government for the
immediate expulsion from the frontier zones of all semi-military organisations
and for the suppression of the various “assistance” Committees for Karelia.
The Note in which the Finnish Government replied was hostile, even challenging in character. No change for the better took place in 1923 ; thus, on September 23, 1923, two members of the Soviet delegation to the Mixed Frontier Commission were killed on Soviet territory some 12 kilometres from the Finnish frontier. Indignant at this murder the Soviet Government demanded the immediate investigation by a Mixed Commission and some additional guarantees, but the Finnish Government avoided giving a satisfactory reply. It was only in July, 1924, that an end was put to the conflict after the Finnish Government had made concessions on a number of points and had carried out changes in the personnel of the Schutz Corps.
On March 17, 1922, an agreement was signed between Latvia, Poland, Finland, and Estonia regarding “ guarantees ” (the so-called “ accord ” policy). This Treaty was actually a military-political alliance directed against Soviet Russia. Its anti-Soviet nature was, indeed, so clear that the majority of the Finnish Seim taking into account the failure of the Karelian adventure and being afraid that the agreement of March 17, 1922, would inevitably lead to a new military conflict with the Soviet Republic refused to ratify it and, as a result, one of the authors of this agreement, the Finnish Minister Holsti, was compelled to resign.
The great hostility of the Government of Finland towards the Soviet Union manifested itself in particular in the speech of the Finnish Representative, Enkel, in the autumn of 1924 at the Assembly of the League of Nations. Enkel called on the League of Nations to intervene in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R. in the so-called “ Georgian question.” This time it was not a case of Karelia in which Finland was “ interested,” but Georgia, which it would have seemed was and could be of no particular interest to Finland.
At the end of 1926 a Government with Tanner at its head, came to power in Finland. This Government, so far from making any effort to put an end to the anti-Soviet bias of Finnish foreign policy, actually in various ways, encouraged the activities of the Russian White Guards who had transformed Finland into a nest of hostilities against the U.S.S.R. For instance, the traces revealed by the investigation of the explosion organised by White Guards in the Leningrad business club in 1927, led direct to Helsinki. Precisely at this period the President of Finland, Relander, carried on prolonged negotiations with the “representative” of the Russian monarchists, Grevenitz, endeavouring to obtain a guarantee that he would recognise the independence of Finland after the overthrow of the Soviet Government. It should be noted that Grevenitz, on his part, avoided the formulation of any clear guarantee regarding the independence of Finland after the proposed overthrow of the Soviet Government.
In this connection, it is interesting to recall that at the time of the Yudenitch attack on Petrograd in 1919, the Finnish Government, through Mannerheim, demanded from General Koltchak the de jure recognition of the independence of Finland as a condition for the formal and direct participation of Finland in the war against the Soviet Government. Koltchak, who looked upon himself as the heir and perpetuator of Tsarism categorically refused such recognition.
Beginning with 1925, the Soviet Government began the policy of concluding with their neighbours pacts of non-aggression and neutrality. It is quite evident that these Pacts should have served as guarantees for the preservation of peace and the consolidation of good-neighbourly relations. In May, 1926, the Soviet Government offered Finland the conclusion of a Pact of non-aggression and neutrality. Unable, in view of their own public opinion, to reject openly such a proposal, the Finnish Government accepted it in words, actually, however, they sabotaged the conclusion of this agreement in every possible way and the Pact was not signed until 1932.
In the period with which we are dealing the Finnish Government not only themselves pursued a hostile policy towards the Soviet Union, but in a number of cases they took the initiative in organising international combinations of an anti-Soviet character. We have already noted the part played by Finnish foreign policy in the creation of the Warsaw “ guarantee ” agreement of March 17, 1922. Equally hostile towards the Soviets was the line taken by the Finnish Government at the Moscow Conference for the limitation of armaments, called on the initiative of the Soviet Government in December, 1922. At this Conference the Soviet Government proposed a proportional decrease of its own army as well as of the armies of all the neighbouring countries. The Finnish Delegation which took a most active part did its best to bring about the failure of the Conference.
Estonia
The signature of a peace agreement with Soviet Russia did not lead to a cessation of hostile activities on the part of Estonia. Committees “for the assistance of Karelia” were organised on her territory, and monetary collections were made for the “White” Karelian insurgents.
Already, at the Moscow Conference on the limitation of armaments in 1922, Estonia had submitted completely to the leadership of Finland.
In 1924 the Minister for Home Affairs of Estonia, Einbund, in a public speech, made lying and unfounded accusations against the U.S.S.R. After a sharp note of protest from the Soviet Government the Estonia Government was compelled to admit that the information made public by Einbund, as well as his conclusions therefrom, were based on false reports and had been proved erroneous. Einbund himself was soon afterwards compelled to resign. In 1925 the Estonian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pusta, manifested exceptional hostility towards the Soviets. He was one of the active initiators of the Helsingfors Conference of the Baltic States which was held in January, 1925. Although the official negotiations at this Conference of the four Baltic States (Finland, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia) only resulted in the signature of an arbitration Treaty, side by side with this Conference in Helsingfors consultations took place between representatives of the General Staffs of Poland, Rumania, and the Baltic countries (with the exception of Lithuania). These conversations were carried on in Riga; the participants for a long time stubbornly denied that any such consultations of the General Staffs had taken place, and it was only after the Soviet Government had presented facts which could not he denied that the Latvian Minister for Home Affairs was compelled to admit that such consultations had indeed taken place in Riga.
The Protocols of these Conferences or consultations which were discovered after the union of the Baltic States with the U.S.S.R., leave no room for doubt whatever that at all of them plans for united military activity against the U.S.S.R. had been discussed.
Simultaneously, the Estonian Government openly sabotaged the negotiations for the conclusion of a Pact of Non-Aggression and Neutrality—negotiations which had been proposed to Estonia by the Soviet Government in 1926. This open sabotage was revealed in a speech of the Estonian Minister in Moscow, Birk, who gave incontestable facts showing how Estonian foreign policy was dependent on the Polish General Staff.
Latvia
Immediately after the coming into force of the Latvian-Soviet Peace Treaty a serious incident arose in regard to the open help given by Latvia to Wrangel. Intensive recruiting of soldiers and officers for the Wrangel army was being conducted on Latvian territory. In its Note of October 31, 1920, the Soviet Peoples’ Commissariat for Foreign Affairs protested against this violation of the spirit and meaning of the peace treaty ; in particular it cited the fact that 200 officers had arrived in Memel from Riga on their way to the Crimea to Wrangel. In his note of reply the Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Meyerovitz, admitted that an organisation for the recruiting of soldiers and officers for the Wrangel army did indeed exist on Latvian territory. On November 4, 1920, the question was discussed at the Latvian Constituent Assembly and it became evident that well-known generals of the Latvian army, including the Inspector of the Army, Radzinsh, were mixed up in this recruiting activity.
In 1921, a new incident occurred in connection with the arrest and the beating up of three members of the Soviet Consulate in Libava. This incident ended with the dismissal of the chief of the political Guard of the Libava district.
In the autumn of 1923 the Soviet Government, true to its policy of strengthening peace relations with the Baltic countries, proposed to the Latvian Government to start negotiations for the conclusion of a Pact of Non-Aggression and Neutrality. Although the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Meyerovitz, expressed his agreement in principle to proceed with such negotiations, actually, as a result of the procrastinations of the Latvian Government, they only took place in 1926.
As we have already shown above, Latvia participated in the Conferences of the General Staffs of the Baltic countries, Poland and Rumania, which were held in Riga in February, 1925.
On February 5, 1926, an armed attack was made on the Soviet diplomatic couriers, Nette and Makhmastalya, on Latvian territory, and Nette was killed. Before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the Latvian Minister for Home Affairs, Laiminsh, in an interview with the representatives of the Riga press, characterised the attack on the Soviet diplomatic couriers as an ordinary crime for the purpose of robbery. This was a definite attempt to hide the real political aim of the crime and to cover up the traces. As a result of the protest of the Peoples Commissariat for Foreign Affairs the Latvian Government was compelled to dissociate itself fzom their Minister for Home Affairs. A promise was also given that the Soviet Diplomatic Mission in Riga would be informed regarding the course of the preliminary investigation. However, the investigation was quite evidently carried out with the aim not of discovering but of concealing the real criminals and it led to no result.
In spite of this hostile line pursued by the Latvian Government, the Government of the U.S.S.R. in 1926 again proposed to renew the negotiations for the conclusion of a Pact of Non-Aggression and Neutrality. Again the Latvian Government, this time through their Minister for Foreign Affairs, the leader of the Peasants’ Union and future President of Latvia, Ulmanis, agreed to the start of negotiations. However, this time, too, the Latvian Government manifested no real desire to conclude such a Peace Pact. The frequent journeys of Ulmanis, sometimes to Reval, sometimes to Kovno, his evasive replies to the Soviet proposals, and his constant side glances towards Warsaw—all this indicated that Latvia was a supporter of the Polish policy of the “Round Table,” i.e., the conduct of negotiations and the conclusion of a pact between the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and on the other the whole of the Baltic States combined.
It was only after the change of the Cabinet and the coming to power of a Left Government in Latvia at the end of 1926, that conditions arose which finally led to a Pact of Non-Aggression and Neutrality being initialled between the U.S.S.R. and Latvia on March 9, 1927. Simultaneously therewith a Soviet-Latvian Trade Agreement, exceptionally advantageous to Latvia, was also signed.
It is characteristic of the anti-Soviet policy of the Latvian Government that an interval of nearly five years elapsed between the initialling of the Pact of Non-Aggression and Neutrality (March 9, 1927) and its final signature (February 5, 1932). In the course of these five years, Latvia systematically refused to sign the already initialled Pact, giving as an excuse that her Baltic neighbours—Estonia and Finland—had also not signed such Pacts and demanding the above-mentioned “Round-Table” Conference.
Lithuania
In contradistinction to the other Baltic States (Finland, Estonia and Latvia), the foreign policy of Lithuania was less hostile in relation to the U.S.S.R. This was to be explained by the PolishLithuanian conflict which had arisen as a result of the seizure by Poland of the Vilno Province of Lithuania in 1920. As a result of these circumstances, Lithuania refused to enter into any combination with Poland.
When at the time of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920, Vilno was occupied by Soviet troops, the Soviet Government transferred this town to Lithuania. In the Soviet-Lithuanian Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, Vilno and the Vilno region were recognised as constituent parts of the Lithuanian State. When in 1926 the Soviet Government proposed to the Baltic countries negotiations for the conclusion of Pacts of Non-Aggression and Neutrality, then, unlike the other Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Finland) which in one way or another had sabotaged these negotiations and refused to conclude such pacts until 1932, Lithuania accepted the Soviet proposal and on September a8, 1926, a Soviet-Lithuanian Pact of Non-Aggression and Neutrality was signed. This Pact was accompanied by an exchange of Notes. The Soviet Note pointed out that “ the factual violation of the Lithuanian frontiers which had taken place against the will of the Lithuanian people (the seizure by Poland of the Vilno region) had in no way altered their (the Government of the U.S.S.R.) attitude to the territorial sovereignty of Lithuania as defined in the Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty.”
As we shall see below Lithuania, having joined the Baltic Entente (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) in 1934, could not but also subsequently adopt an anti-Soviet foreign policy, for those who had initiated this Entente did not conceal their endeavour to rely, in the last resort, on Poland.
↗