latviski
THE U.S.S.R. and THE BALTIC COUNTRIES IN 1939-1940 .
Events have shown that there was indeed cause for uneasiness regarding the attitude of the Baltic countries on the question of the guarantee of their independence. This position was demonstrated particularly strikingly somewhat later—during the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in the autumn of 1939. What did the Soviet Union propose to Finland ? As distinct from the methods adopted by the Hitlerian diplomacy, the Soviet Government did not infringe the sovereignty and independence of the Finnish State ; did not present to Finland demands incompatible with the honour and self-respect of an independent country.
In view of the fact that the old Soviet-Finnish frontier was within some 32 kilometres from Leningrad, and that all the Islands in the Gulf of Finland situated in the direct vicinity of the only naval sea port of the U.S.S.R. in the Baltic—Kronstadt—were in Finnish hands, the Soviet Government proposed in a friendly way to exchange these islands and part of the territory on the Karelian Isthmus (to assure greater security for Leningrad), for a considerably larger piece of Soviet territory in Soviet Karelia. It goes without saying that such an exchange of territory is in no way a violation of the sovereignty of another State.
These proposals of the Soviet Union were opposed decisively by the Finnish Government. Preliminary negotiations on this question had already taken place in March, 1939, and were resumed in October of the same year. On both occasions the Finnish Government, by its attitude, brought the negotiations to nought. Moreover, in November, 1939, Finland, by provocative action on the frontier, brought about a Finnish-Soviet armed conflict.
The Peace Treaty, of March 12, 1940, once again reflected the fundamental line of Soviet foreign policy respecting the Baltic States. The whole world press, as well as the military experts of many countries, recognised that the Soviet tromps having broken the fortifications of the “ Mannerheim Line ” could have occupied the whole of Finland, but the Soviet Union refrained. The Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, demanded neither military contributions, nor any other humiliating terms for Finland. Fundamentally, the terms did not differ so very much from the proposals which the Soviet Government had made to Finland before the Finnish-Soviet armed conflict. The terms of the Peace Treaty, as the original proposals, only sought to safeguard the security of the U.S.S.R.
During the last years of their existence the Governments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia showed by all their behaviour that they were prepared to aid Hitler in every way, and to make it easy for him to seize the Baltic States.
Hitler was preparing to seize the Baltic States, and the Governments of these States were preparing to put their territory at Hitler’s disposal immediately he demanded it. Just as the President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Khvalkovsky, summoned by Hitler to Berlin, in March, 1939, without any resistance, put their Fatherland “ under the protection of Hitler,” so the spokesmen of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (not to speak of Finland) were only awaiting a similar summons to Berlin or a simple order by wire.
This is exactly what happened in Finland when Hitler, after the signature of the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, demanded the right to bring German troops into Finland. In this case no pressure was exerted by Hitler, everything proceeded by mutual consent. The Finnish Government neither informed nor made any appeal to the U.S.S.R. regarding Hitler’s demand, but, on the contrary, they denied officially that German troops were in Finland, or alternatively affirmed that such troops as were there, were only in transit through Finland to . . . Norway.
In the autumn of 1939 the Soviet Union, for the purpose of assuring her own security against a possible aggression by Hitler, proposed to the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) the conclusion of agreements for Mutual Assistance ; at the same time the Soviet Government requested that the U.S.S.R. be granted the right to create naval and air bases on the territories of the three States.
This was the only possible and essential measure which the Soviet Government could adopt, because the behaviour of the Governments of these States, as shown above, had furnished no convincing political guarantees whatever that these countries would not become places d’armes for attacks on the Soviet Union. It is characteristic that when Finland categorically refused to conclude a Pact of Mutual Assistance, the Soviet Government did not insist on it, but limited themselves to the proposal for a territorial exchange and for the lease of the Hango peninsula:
The Mutual Assistance Pacts concluded in the autumn of 1939 between the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the other, did not give any positive results in view of the anti-Soviet policy of the Governments of these States. Instead of pursuing a loyal policy and consolidating their friendship with the U.S.S.R.—a policy which would have safeguarded their own security, the Governments of the Baltic States continued their policy for the organisation and strengthening of their territories as anti-Soviet jumping-off grounds.
The military alliance between Latvia and Estonia which was directed against the U.S.S.R. was extended by the entry therein of Lithuania. In addition, the Latvian Government endeavoured insistently to draw Finland also into this military alliance. In December, 1939 and in March, 1940, two secret Conferences between the three Baltic States were held. Simultaneously, the connections between the General Staffs of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania were strengthened, this being done in secret without informing the U.S.S.R. of the fact.
Whilst the U.S.S.R. was carrying out loyally all the decisions of the Soviet-Lithuanian, Soviet-Estonian and Soviet-Latvian Pacts of Mutual Assistance, the Governments of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia violated the Statute contained in all three Pacts, forbidding the Contracting Parties “ to conclude any alliances or to participate in coalitions directed against either of the Contracting Parties.”
In these circumstances, and bearing in mind all the facts discussed above of the anti-Soviet policy of the Governments of the Baltic States, the U.S.S.R. was compelled to demand from all three States the formation of such Governments as would be capable and willing to ensure that the Pacts of Mutual Assistance would be loyally carried out.
Such Governments, as is known, were formed in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They appealed to the peoples of these countries and held elections to their respective Parliaments, and for a whole month the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia discussed freely the merits of their candidates. The elections, which took place on July 14 and 15, 1940, were held on strictly democratic lines. In Estonia “ The Alliance of Working People of Estonia,” which stood for the establishment of the closest possible union and friendship of Estonia with the U.S.S.R. received nearly 93 per cent. of all the votes cast.
In Latvia, the candidates of the bloc of the “ Labouring People of Latvia ” received 97.6 per cent. of the votes cast.
Finally, in Lithuania, the candidates of the “ Labour Alliance of Lithuania ” received 99.19 per cent. of all the votes cast.
The percentage of participants in the elections in all three Republics was very high, being about 95 per cent. of the whole of the electorates, a thing which had never occurred before in these countries.
The elections demonstrated the real will of the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—the determination to establish friendship and a solid association with the peoples of the U.S.S.R.
The elections proved that the anti-Soviet policy of the former Governments of the Baltic States had no support whatever amongst the masses of the people.
The representative assemblies elected on July 14 and 15, 1940, in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, by universal suffrage, established Soviet Governments in the three Baltic States and decided on the entry of these States into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
On August 3rd, 5th and 6th, 1940, the 7th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted laws permitting the entry of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the U.S.S.R.
Conclusion
All the above mentioned facts from the history of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. towards the Baltic States, as also regarding the attitude of these States during the period 1917 to 1940, lead to. the following indisputable conclusions :—
1. The Soviet Union invariably and systematically manifested a sincere desire and had striven for peaceful and good-neighbourly relations with the Baltic States.
2. Although the separation of the Baltic States from Russia had resulted in considerable political, economic and strategic inconveniences, the Soviet Government had loyally recognised and given juridicial sanction to this separation and with equal loyalty had respected the independence and the integrity of these States.
3. For many years every proposal made by the Soviet Government to the Governments of the Baltic States was directed both towards the strengthening of peaceful mutual relations between the U.S.S.R. and these countries, and the consolidation of the real independence of the Baltic States.
4. The only condition demanded by the Soviet Government was that the Baltic States should not allow their countries to be used as places d’armes for anti-Soviet conspiracies or as jumping-off grounds for anti-Soviet attacks. The Soviet Union demanded only one essential condition, viz., that no country should be permitted or given any opportunity to create a Protectorate in any form whatsoever over the Baltic countries. There is no reasonable and unbiased statesman in any part of the world who would not recognise that this condition laid down by the Soviet Union was a loyal and just condition, and in no way violated the sovereign rights of the Baltic States. On the contrary, this demand only strengthened the real independence and security of these States.
5. But both the foreign and home policy pursued by the Govern- ments of the Baltic States during the whole of the period under review, not only demonstrated their hostility to the Soviet Republic, but systematically violated precisely the one essential condition for peaceful, good-neighbourly co-existence—the condition which, had it been respected, would have formed a real basis for their independence and self-determination and the maintenance of peace.
6. The behaviour of the Baltic States in 1939-1940 showed that these States had become fully “ ripe ” for submitting without resistance to any demands made by Hitler for furthering the attack he was preparing on the Soviet Union. In particular the behaviour of Finland, the only Baltic State which had not entered the Soviet Union in 1940 confirms the correctness of this view. Finland not only gave her consent to the entry of German troops, but also to the transformation of her territory into a jumping-off ground for an attack on the Soviet Union. Moreover, she herself is participating in this attack.
7. The U.S.S.R. never, either in words or in deeds, threatened the independence of the Baltic countries. On the contrary, she was herself interested in their independence. There was therefore no reason whatever for the formation in the Baltic States of various blocs and coalitions directed ostensibly against " threats on the part of the U.S.S.R." In any case, none of these blocs and coalitions could have defended the Baltic States had the U.S.S.R. really desired to violate their independence.
Given the goodwill of their Governments, the Baltic States could have become effective buffer States which might have eased the international position in Eastern Europe instead of making it more acute. Real friendship with the U.S.S.R. would have been the best guarantee for the independence of the Baltic States.
We have demonstrated above that the behaviour of the Governments of the Baltic States was of quite a different nature—it was not friendship, but hostility towards the Soviet Union which they encouraged during 20 years.
8. The Soviet Union could not but draw the only possible deduction from all these facts, and in 1940 it was constrained to demand that there should be a change in the Governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—since their hostility towards the U.S.S.R. threatened the complete subordination of the Baltic States to German Fascism.
Only politically blind people or the hopelessly stupid did not understand that had Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia not entered the Soviet Union in 1940, they would have shared the fate of Czechoslovakia, Norway, Denmark and other countries which have been enslaved by Hitler.
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